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SCOTT ON TRUSTS: A REVIEW*
Lewis M. Simest

SCOTT, in his four volume work on the Law of
PROFESSOR
Trusts, has given us a book worthy to stand beside the two other
great American treatises on this subject, the American Law Institute
Restatement of the Law of Trusts, and Bogert on Trusts and Trustees.
Since the reviews of Professor Scott's book already published have been
as numerous as they have been favorable, 1 I shall content myself with
discussing it as a whole and shall refrain from detailed comment on its
treatment of particular rules. More particularly, I shall attempt to compare it with the two other leading American works on trusts. Perhaps,
also, it will be possible to throw some light on the question which arises
in the mind of the lawyer whose library is necessarily small: If I have
the "Restatement of Trusts" and "Bogert," do I need "Scott"? Or, if
I have "Scott," do I need either of the other two? I believe the answer
is: the lawyer should have all three. To give the reasons for this conclusion is the principal object of this review.
Professor Scott's treatise consists of three volumes of text, and a
fourth volume of indices. His general plan follows very closely that of
the Restatement of Trusts, for which he was the Reporter, and which,
to the extent that any one person may be said to be the author, he wrote.
The scope of both treatises is substantially the same,2 except that Professor Scott treats fully of constructive trusts while the Restatement of
Trusts does not. Professor Scott tells us in his preface, he has "not dealt
in systematic detail with questions of taxation, or questions of business
trusts, or questions of the use of the trust in security transactions, or
questions of the application of the rule against perpetuities, or questions
of the conflict of laws." Though the Restatement of Trusts does not

* The Law of Trusts. ( 4 vols.) By Austin Wakeman Scott-Dane Professor of
Law, Harvard University. Bostoµ: Little, Brown & Co. 1939. Pp. Vol. r: i-xlv, 1-816;
Vol. 2: i-xvi, 817-1727; Vol. 3, i-xvi, 1729-2604; Vol. 4: 2605-2981. $35.
Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
,
1 See reviews in 20 Boor. UNiv. L. REv. 169 (1940); 39 CoL. L. REv. 1453
(1939); 53 HARv. L. REV. 693 (1940); 25 lowA L. REv. 408 (1940); 6 Omo
STATE UNiv. L. J. 249 (1940); 26 VA. L. REV. 841 (1940); 26 A. B. A. J. 539
(1940); 24 MINN. L. REV. 887 (1940); 17 N. Y. UNIV. L. Q. REV. 485 (1940);
88 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 889 (1940).
2 As to scope of the Restatement of Trusts, see 1 TRUSTS RESTATEMENT, § 1
(1935).
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include constructive trusts, that subject is included in the Restatement
of the Law 0£ Restitution; and Professor Scott was the Reporter, also,
for that part of the Restatement 0£ Restitution. Section numbers in
Professor Scott's treatise are the same as those of the Restatement of
Trusts dealing with the same subject matter. While the section numbers
of the portions of Professor Scott's work dealing with constructive trusts
do not correspond to those of the Restatement of Restitution, he gives
us a table of corresponding sections, so that it is easy to compare the
two works on any given point. Not only does Professor Scott use the
same section numbers as the· Restatement of Trusts, but he also uses
the same chapter headings, and, in ge~eral, the same outline. If, as is
frequently the case, he desires to subdivide the subject of a section of
the Restatement into several sections, decimals are used in the numbering. If he wishes to insert a section having no counterpart in the
Restatement, a letter is added. Thus, he gives us personal opinions in
a section numbered 271A, and entitled <~General observations on power
of creditor to reach trust property." In the portion dealing with constructive trusts there is more variation from the Restatement pattern
in that the last thirty-one sections of Professor Scott's treatise have no
counterparts in particular sections of the Restatement of Restitution.
A quantitative comparison of Professor Scott's work with the other
two leading texts discloses 2604 pages of text and notes exclusive of
indices; the Restatement of Trusts, together with the part of the Restatement of Restitution dealing with constructive trusts, contain I 63 8
pages, exclusive of index. Professor Bogert's treatise on Trusts and
Trustees contains 2942 pages ( four volumes) of text and footnotes,
exclusive of one volume of indices and two volumes of forms. Of course,
.this only suggests relative size in a rough way, for, to be precise,
account should be taken of minor variations in size of page and publishers' style. Moreover, it should be pointed out that the Restatement
of Trusts is vyithout footnotes or citation of cases. Professor Bogert deals
with topics outside the area which Professor Scott marks out for his
treatise. Thus, Professor Bogert states that he deals with ccallied topics
which affect trust creation and administration, as, for example, tax law,
perpetuities, and accumulations..•." 8
· But to discuss quantity and scope is to give very little idea of the '
character of Professor Scott's excellent work. Like the Restatement, its
approach is essentially analytical. Not content to discuss merely points
raised in the decided cases, which, however, have been scrutinized with
meticulous care, he considers all the logical possibilities in a given
8

I BoGERT, TRUSTS

AND

TRUSTEES, preface, p. v. (1935).
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situation and discusses them one by one with clarity and precision. Instead of the "illustrations" used constantly in the Restatement to make
clear the principle, Professor Scott gives us the essential facts of decided cases, accompanied with pertinent criticism. These discussions of
cases appear in the text rather than in footnotes.
The author's style is simple, precise and crystal clear. He adopts
the first person throughout, evidently with a view to securing a certain
directness and informality which would not be possible in a work like
the Restatement of Trusts. At times his style does bring the author
very close to us. One can almost see him lecturing in the class room
when he gives us that delightful account, at the beginning of his chapter
on charitable trusts, of the will of Mr. Stephen Girard and the litigation over it. Occasionally, however ( and I have found this particularly
true in some parts of his chapter on administration), he relapses into
the typical Institute style in which the law is laid down without reasons
in a colorless, impersonal manner, and which the occasional use of the
first person does little to alleviate. For example, section 208 is very
much after the manner of Institute blackletter, though it must be conceded that in succeeding sections the author does give his reasons.
The author's rigidly analytical approach, like that of the Restatement, occasionally results in repetitions and sometimes in a statement
of the very obvious. Thus, in the chapter on charitable trusts, the part
on the creation of charitable trusts contains paragraph after paragraph
which merely indicates that the principle is the same as that applicable
to private trusts. For a statement of the obvious, see the first sentence
of section r 13.r, which is as follows: "Although ordinarily a trust is
created in favor of several beneficiaries, it can be created in favor of a
single beneficiary."
As to the accuracy and scholarly thoroughness of Professor Scott's
treatise, I have found both to be of the highest order. While one may
disagree with the author occasionally on matters of opinion, I have
found no errors in his statements of what is the law.
Citation of authority is very full, though not always exhaustive.
Pertinent law review material and commercial annotations are cited
fully throughout.
A word should be said about the index. It was prepared by Professor Griswold, who also made the index for the Restatement of Trusts.
If anyone has ever made a better index for a law book, I have not
discovered it. For weeks I have had Professor Scott's treatise on my
desk, consulting it as a reference work almost daily, and the index has
never failed to guide me speedily to the material sought.
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One more characteristic of this treatise should be mentioned, which,
until the American Law Institute began- its work, would have been
unique in American legal writing, namely: This is a by-product of
group research. That is to say: ideas, theories and concepts which were
evolved or clarified in the discussions of the American Law Institute
Committee on Trusts find their way into this book. Professor Scott is
the first to recognize this. In his •preface, referring to the numerous
Institute conferences on the law of Trusts, he says:
"No one could emerge from -such conferences without being a
wiser man. It may be that a philosopher or a poet can do his best
work in lonely silence; but one who is dealing with a social science
or social art needs the help of his fellows. What is essential in
dealing with the materials of the law is experience and judgment
in the affairs of men. The group has a wider experience than any
member of the group; and the combined judgment of the group is
usually a wiser judgment than that of any of its members. So at
least I believe."
I must say that my own experience as a member of another group of
the American Law Institute leads me to agree fully with this statement.
Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that Professor Scott in his
treatise is not speaking for the American Law Institute. He indicates
that he has felt free to criticise the rule stated by the Restatement, and
that "this treatise is a work for which I am alone responsible." However, I have observed that in the instances where he disagrees with the
Restatement, it is a disagreement as to what is the better policy rather
than what is the law.
,
With this brief account of the general character of the treatise, let
us now compare it with the Restatement and with Professor Bogert's
work. It may be said that to compare it with the Restatement of Trusts
is rather a futile task, since it is but comparing Scott with Scott. Yet I
believe that is not precisely the situation. At any rate a brief observation
as to the form and objectives of the American Law Institute Restatement may help us to distinguish Scott, the Reporter, from Scott, in
propria persona.
From the start, those engaged in the American Law Institute task
of Restatement have proceeded on the assumption that there is an
American common law, and that it could be found and stated by a
process of research, analysis and logic.4 The avowed purpose of the
4 See Report of the Committee on the Establishment of a Permanent Organization
for the Improvement of the Law Proposing the Establishment of an American Law
Institute; I PRoc. AM. L. INST., Part I (1923); 2 ibid., 21, 37 (1924).
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Institute in its Restatement was to eliminate conflict and complexity,
and to obviate the task of examining a constantly growing mass of
bewildering precedents. It did this, not by stating what the law ought
to be, but by stating this idealized thing, the common law. If a conflict was found in the decisions, it stated what was believed to be the
better view, provided this was sufficiently consistent with the authorities
and with the spirit of our legal system that it could fairly be said to
be the law. Only one view was ever stated. Each blackletter statement
of the law was presented in such form as to be complete in itself; and
was stated without reasons and without supporting authority. This
might be followed by comment indicating the reason back of the rule,
but never by argument. The expectation was, and is, that the prestige
given to the Restatement by the large body of eminent members of the
bar who are included in its membership and who approve its Restatement, would be sufficient to make it a prima facie correct statement of
the law, 5 to an extent not possible by a treatise prepared in the usual
way.
It must not be supposed that those engaged in the Restatement ever
ignored the decisions or made up the Restatement "out of whole cloth."
And I commend to any one interested in the way in which the Restatement has been put together the excellent discussion of that matter in
Professor Scott's preface. Nevertheless, it was, of course, recognized
that, in taking one view where the authorities are in conflict, the Institute refused to state the view expressed by the other body of authority;
that the Institute could state as the law a proposition not supported
by a single case precisely in point; and that, within such limits as are
supposed to circumscribe the function of a judge in a court of last
resort, the Institute could refuse to follow certain illogical doctrines
not consistent with the general body of authority. In other words, the
5 "Now, if you can have the law systematically, scientifically stated, the principles
stated by competent men, giving their discussions of the theories upon which their
statements are based, giving a presentation and discussion of all the judicial decisions
upon which their statements are based, and if such statement can be revised and criticised and tested by a competent group of lawyers of eminence, and where their work
is done if their conclusions can be submitted to the bar that we have here, if that can
be done when the work is completed, we will have a statement of the common law
of America which will be the prima facie basis on which judicial action will re;t; and
any lawyer, whose interest in litigation requires him to say that a different view of
the law shall be taken, will have upon his shoulders the burden to overturn the
statement." Address of Elihu Root in presenting the Report of the Committee on the
Establishment of a Permanent Organization for the Improvement of the Law Proposing
the Establishment of an American Law Institute, February 23, 1923, in I PRoc. AM.
L. INST., pt. 2, P· 51 (1923).
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Institute was, and is, stating, not the laws of forty-eight states in the
form of a single statement because they happen to coincide, but "the
common law,"-which would seem to be pretty much the same thing
as the taught law of the national law schools.
Now, if a lawyer has the Restatement of the Law of Trusts-which,
by the way, I am disposed to believe is one of the best of the American
Law Institute Restatements-does Professor Scott's work add anything? In the first place, it is sometimes said that the form of the
Restatement is unfamiliar to the American lawyer, that he is accustomed to work out his law by decided cases, and will not substitute
the authority of the Institute for them. In view of the increasing use
of the Restatement by lawyers and courts, however, that will probably
be less and less true as time goes on. Moreover, in many states the
citation of local authority relative to the rules of the Restatement is
embodied in state annotations of the Restatement. Nevertheless, I
think Professor Scott's work still adds much to the Restatement of
Trusts in that it is couched in a much more informal style, and contains,
not merely citations of cases, but critical discussions of large numbers
of them. Indeed, it is my belief that the average· lawyer will learn to
avail himself of the valuable results of research contained in the various
Restatements only when he can secure such expositions of them as Williston on Contracts and Scott on Trusts.
But even though one becomes accustomed to the form of the Restatement ( and I think that is a feat of not too great difficulty for any
competent lawyer), there still remains the fact that this form excludes
many things which are possible in the usual type of treatise. There can
be no adequate discussion of social trends; nor can we say that the law
is a living, moving thing, just now passing point A, but moving rapidly
toward point B. Neither can we say how the stated rule functions in
the hands of the too-human judge. It is interesting to note, in contrast,
how fully Professor Scott illuminates his discussions by· this form of
presentation. Thus, one should compare section 44, comment c, of the
Restatement of Trusts, relative to the perfor_mance of an oral trust of
an interest in land created inter vivas where the transferee is in a
confidential relation to the transferor, with the following statement in
Scott on Trusts, at page 256:
"The truth of the matter seems to be that whenever a court wishes
to compel the transferee to reconvey the property, it can always do
so by laying stress upon the confidential relation existing between
the transferor and transferee, and by stating that the Statute of
Frauds is a shield and not a sword, that it was intended to prevent
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fraud and not to promote fraud, and that the transferee was guilty
of 'constructive fraud' in refusing to reconvey the land. On the
other hand, if the court wishes to deny relief to the transferor, it
can always do so by laying stress upon the policy of the Statute of
Frauds...."
Another instance, on page r200, is an observation about the manner in
which precedents as to trust investments are used by courts. The following quotation, taken from the conclusion of Professor Scott's discussion of the power of a creditor to reach trust property, shows just
how he includes matters which the Restatements leave untouched. At
page r 529, he says:
"In the Restatement of Trusts it is stated that creditors are·
allowed to reach the trust estate in the four situations above enumerated. The question remains, however, whether it is only in these
four situations that he can reach the trust estate. No position on
that question was taken in the Restatement, but the matter was
left open. It is believed, however, that although in the present
state of the authorities it cannot be stated that creditors can reach
the trust estate in situations other than these four, yet the trend
of the law is in the direction of extending the power of creditors
to reach the trust estate."
Other similar passages could be cited to show the extensive inclusion
of the sort of material that could not be included in the Restatement
because of its form, but that is invaluable to the lawyer and judge. 6
Furthermore, Professor Scott's text in several instances supplies
a deficiency of the Restatement arising from its use of the caveat.
Doubtless, if it was not possible for the members of the Institute to
agree upon an authoritative statement of the law on any given point
on which little or no authority exists, the only honest thing to do was,
not to give the matter silent treatment, but to state expressly that the
Institute takes no position on this point. This, in fact, was sometimes
done by a statement to that effect headed "Caveat." In a number of
these instances, however, Professor Scott has ~ot hesitated to give us
his opinion as to the state of the law. An example of this is found in
his discussion of liabilities to third parties,. one of the finest portions
of the treatise. 7
See, for example, 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS 192, 234, 748 (1939).
2 TRUSTS REsTATEMENT 821, 835; 2 ScoTT, TRusTS 1497-1499, 1528-1535.
For other illustrations, see I TRUSTS RESTATEMENT 196 and I ScoTT, TRUSTS 393;
I TRUSTS RESTATEMENT 370 and I ScoTT, TRUSTS 754-757.
6

7
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Then, my imaginary lawyer friend in search of advice about his
library will say: you convince me that I should have Scott, but why
do I need the Restatement? It seems to me the answer is just this.
True, the Restatement is formal in style; it does not discuss authorities;
occasionally we draw a blank in the form of a "caveat" when we want
a definite answer. But these things may be necessary if we are to present the Restatement to the world as a work approved by the distinguished lawyers and judges included in the membership of the Institute.
Only up to a certain point can we expect them to agree. But certainly
it is extremely valuable to know precisely how far they actually did
agree as to the state of the common law.8 Moreover, whether the lawyer regards that as significant or not, too many judges are going to
follow the Restatement for him to ignore its authority. Finally, the
full significance of some of the statements in Professor Scott's book
cannot be appreciated without comparing portions of the Restatement
which he does not quote.
But if the lawyer has Scott on Trusts and the Restatement of Trusts
in his library, why should he have Professor Bogert's work? Of course,
we could easily base an affirmative answer on the fact that the scope of
the Bogert treatise is more inclusive, or that it is already regarded so
highly by the courts and so frequently cited by them, that one cannot afford to be without it. But there is another reason which goes much
deeper: the objectives of the two authors in writing their respective
treatises are different.
. Essentially Professor Scott's objective is the same as that of the
Restatement of Trusts, in spite of elaborate critical discussions of cases,
and penetrating references to trends and to the judicial process. He
seeks to state an idealized product, not the law of any one of the fortyeight states, but a forty-ninth thing,-limited it is true by the decisions
in those forty-eight states, but not necessarily controlled by any one
8 Of course, it is realized that to say that the Restatement represents the individual
views of the majority of the members of the Institute is pure fiction. On the other
hand, it would be equally fictional to say that it represents no more than the views
of the reporter and a bare majority of his advisers. On any controverted point, and
on any proposition which might sei.m strange to the average lawyer, the Reporter's
statement is likely to be called in question, and a test vote take place either in the
Council of the Institute or at the General Meeting or both. Indeed, when we see that
the Restatement must always run the gauntlet of two or more sessions of the Restatement Committee, the Institute Council, and the General Meeting, besides being subj ected to written criticisms by any member who desires to send in his views to the
Director, it would seem that the Restatement represents quite as much the authorization of the members as a resolution adopted by the convention of any national scientific or religious body.
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of those decisions,-namely the common law. 9 Thus, the fact that there
are no decisions precisely in point does not always foreclose a statement
that a given proposition is the law, nor does the fact that the authorities
are equally divided. Of course, the state of the authorities can be defermined by an examination of the decisions cited in the footnotes; and
sometimes we are furnished with a discussion of the state of the
authorities in the text. But in a sense the authorities are secondary; this
is essentially a piece of analytical jurisprudence.
Professor Bogert, on the other hand, is stating the law of fortyeight states; he thinks of it, as the practitioner does, as forty-eight
systems of law. In his preface he says: "The plan has been to include
within a single work a digest of English and American case and statute
law ... a discussion on principle of disputed points...." I do not mean
that Professor Bogert fails to discuss the common law of trusts, for he
does. But somehow the emphasis is different. He is trying primarily to
give us a picture of the raw materials of American law, in all their irregularity, and he does so very effectively. Moreover, he emphasizes
statute law in a way that Professor Scott does not. Time after time he
gives us full citation, and sometimes quotation, of statutes state by
state; while Professor Scott is often content either to say that there are
statutes, or, at most, to list the states in which they may be found. But
it must be remembered that Professor Scott has set for himself the task
of stating the common law, not the statute law, of trusts.
A few illustrations may indicate more clearly what is meant. In
discussing the validity of a trust with unborn persons as beneficiaries
Professor Scott ( section 1 12. 1) starts with the dogmatic statement:
"It is not essential that the beneficiaries of a trust should be in existence
at the time of the creation of the trust." Then he goes on to single out
the situation where the only beneficiary is an unborn person, refers to
Professor Bogert's views to the effect that this situation should not be
held to constitute a trust, and gives arguments to the contrary, discussing the rather thin body of case law on that point. Professor Bogert
(section 163), on the other hand, makes no positive statement of the
law beyond that applicable only to the situation where some of the
beneficiaries are in being; but he does express his own views vigorously
and discusses the state of the authorities. He entitles his views: "Suggested Theory."
Or compare section 391 of Professor Scott's book, in which he dis9 The expression "common law'' as used herein includes, of course, the doctrines
of equity as developed by judicial decision.
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cusses "Who can enforce a charitable trust" with section 411 of Professor Bogert's treatise on "The Attorney General as the Representative
of the Beneficiaries of Charitable Trusts." Pr9fessor Bogert, in his footnotes, quotes statutes of Michigan, Ohio, Virginia, Maine, Missouri,
and South Carolina, cites other statutes, cites cases interpreting these
statutes, and in his text summarizes the effect ~f the statutes. Professor
Scott cites no statutes whatever. Again, consider Professor Bogert's
chapter 30 on "Trust Investments-General Standards-State Lists,"
which includes a separate paragraph as to the investment standards of
each of the several jurisdictions of the United States, statutes being
quoted in the text. With that compare Professor Scott's chapter 7, topic
5 (section 227 et seq.), on "Investment of Trust Funds," in which no
attempt is made to consider the law by states, but which includes (page
1224) one paragraph headed "Statutes" that, without citing any statutes, states in a footnote "The statutes can be found collected in the
various Trust Services."
I realize that this comment on Professor Scott's treatise may easily
be misunderstood, and that there is a possible answer to the objection
that his book does not give us all that Professor Bogert's does. In his
delightful Epilogue, Professor Scott tells us he knows perfectly well
that in one sense of the word there is no such thing as the common
law of trusts, but he also frankly asserts that the treatise which precedes is the common law of trusts as he understands it. 10 Moreover,
Professor Scott does discuss and cite some statutes, particularly the
English Trustee Act and statutes prepared by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws; and in one instance, namely his
discussion of spendthrift trusts, he does consider the law by states citing
statutes. One wonders, however, whether that approach in dealing with
spendthrift trusts is not due largely to the influence of Professor Griswold's analysis. Certainly, in many instances Professor Scott refrains
from giving us a dogmatic statement of the law, and merely discusses
conflicting bodies of authority. Nor do I think it can fairly be said that
he distorts the picture of what the law is. The difference between him
and Professor Bogert is one of emphasis. Yet in a sense the two men are
10 3 ScoTT, TRUSTS 2603 says: "This, as I understand it, is the Anglo-American
law of trusts. In a sense, of course, there is no such law. There is the English law
and the law of New York and that of California. There is not an American law of
trusts, although the English judges have occasionally spoken as though there were .•••
There is, nevertheless, an Anglo-American system of law, which consists of legal concepts and principles and traditional techniques. It is this system, in so far as it relates
to trusts, with which I have been deaing in this treatise."
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thinking of a different thing as the law of trusts when they write.
Professor Bogert is the practicing lawyer who is applying the law of
one or more states; Professor Scott is the teacher of the national law
school who finds the common law of trusts a reality.
In conclusion, what I have just said is no more a criticism of Professor Scott's book than it would be for me to say I had rather he had
written about Torts or Conflict of Laws. He has set out to tell us the
common law of trusts, not forty-eight common laws, nor the statute
law of trusts. As a piece of analytical jurisprudence supported by a
critical analysis of leading authorities and dealing with such a large
body of law, I doubt whether his treatise has ever been surpassed. And
I am convinced that it will soon take its place as an authority beside
such works as Wigmore on Evidence and Williston on Contracts.

